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Abstract. In this paper, we propose to replace the national identity card, currently used in many
countries, by a personal device that allows its user to prove some binary statements about him while
minimizing personal information leakage. The privacy of the user is protected through the use of
anonymous credentials that, allows him to prove binary statements about himself to another entity
without having to disclose his identity or any unnecessary information. The proposed scheme also
prevents the possibility of tracing the user, even if he proves several times the same statement (un-
linkability property). A tamper-proof smartcard is used to store the personal information of the user
thus protecting his privacy and preventing the risks of forgery at the same time. The user identifies
himself to the card via biometrics thus forbidding an unauthorized use in the situation where the card
is stolen or lost. Two implementation proposals of the privacy-preserving identity card are described
and discussed, and should be experimented on Java Cards in a near future. Possible extensions are
also proposed as future work.
1 Introduction
Intuitively respecting the principles of data minimization1 and data sovereignty2 when using
a national identity card seems to be at odds with other obligations required in practical
tasks from everyday life such as checking the nationality of the owner of the card when
he crosses a border, verifying his age when he wants to obtain some discount related to
it, or proving that he belongs (or does not belong) to a particular group. In this paper,
we advocate that this intuition is wrong by introducing the concept of privacy-preserving
identity card.
Definition 1 (Privacy-preserving Identity Card). A privacy-preserving identity card is a per-
sonal device that allows its user3 to prove some binary statements about himself (such as
his right of access to some resources) while minimizing personal information leakage.
1The data minimization principle states that only the information necessary to complete a particular applica-
tion should be disclose (and no more). This principle is a direct application of the legitimacy criteria defined by
the European data protection directive (Article 7, [20]).
2The data sovereignty principle states that the data related to an individual belong to him and that he should
stay in control of how these data are used and for which purpose. This principle can be seen as an extension of
many national legislations on medical data that consider that a patient record belongs to the patient, and not to
the doctor that creates or updates it, nor to the hospital that stores it.
3In this paper, we use the word “user” to denote at the same time both the owner and the effective user of the
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Consider for instance the following scenario that illustrates how such a card would work
in practice.
Scenario (Alice in Anonymityland). Alice is privacy-addicted since she has read the semi-
nal paper of Chaum on anonymity [16]. She has recently seen in an advertisement that her
government now offers the possibility of using a privacy-preserving identity card. There-
fore, she goes to the town hall and asks for it. The city hall checks the validity of Alice’s
identity, scans her biometric data and sends them in a secure manner (for instance using
a protected conveyor) along with her personal information to the corresponding govern-
mental service that is responsible for issuing the card.
For an external observer, the card looks exactly the same as any other privacy-preserving
identity card, since there is no personal information written on the plastic card. Effectively,
the card is a tamper-proof smartcard containing anonymous credentials that Alice can use
to prove some statements about her. The card is activated by some of Alice’s biometric
features. For instance, her card allows Alice to prove her nationality when she crosses the
border, to show that she is within some age interval in order to gain some discount at the
theater, to certify her identity when she boards a plane or to gain access to local services
restricted to her neighborhood residents.
If Alice’s card is lost or stolen, she does not need to worry about misuse for malicious pur-
pose, thanks to the biometrics authentication and the tamper-proof features of the smart-
card. Instead, she simply returns to the city hall to declare the loss of her card and ask for
a fresh, identical privacy-preserving identity card.
The outline of the paper is the following. First in Section 2, we detail in an abstract way the
desirable properties that a privacy-preserving identity card should fulfill, before describing
some related work in Section 3. Afterwards in Section 4, we briefly review some enabling
technologies on smartcards, anonymous credentials and biometric authentication that will
be the basis of our practical implementations of the card. Then in Section 5, we briefly
describe how such a card might be used in practice as well as our security assumptions,
before in Section 6 and Section 7 proposing two practical implementations of the privacy-
preserving identity card. Finally, we conclude in Section 8 with a discussion on possible
extensions to the privacy-preserving identity card.
2 Desiderata for a Privacy-preserving Identity Card
In this paper, we adopt a notation inspired from the work of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya
on anonymous credentials [13] (see Section 4.2 for more details). In particular, we call the
owner of the privacy-preserving identity card, the user (who is likely to be a simple citizen
such as Alice). The Registration Authority (RA) is a legal entity (such as the city hall) that can
check the personal information of the user and register the request for a privacy-preserving
identity card. The Certification Authority (CA) is a trusted third party (for instance a dedi-
cated governmental agency) that will sign the information transmitted by the RA to certify
its validity. Once the card has been issued, the RA andCA are no longer involved in the pic-
ture, except if the user needs a new card or if there is a valid reason for lifting the anonymity
of the user. An organization is an entity that can grant access to some of its resources to the
user. (For example, in the scenario an organization could be the immigration services, a
theater or an airline company.) A verifier belongs to one organization and interacts with the
card. Indeed as the user needs to authenticate himself to the card before he can use it, the user of the card will
effectively always be also his owner.
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user to check his right of access to the resources of this organization. In practice, the verifier
is usually a smartcard reader device connected to the network of the organization that can
communicate with the privacy-preserving identity card.
Furthermore, we assume that the verifier is not allowed to ask arbitrary questions to a
privacy-preserving identity card, but rather that he is entitled to ask only one question4 di-
rectly related to the verifier’s role and the resources to which it can grant access. The ques-
tion that a particular verifier is allowed to ask, as well as his public encryption key, are
specified in a credential signed by the CA. The public encryption key of the reader can be
used by the card to communicate confidentially with the reader, whereas the decryption
key is kept secret and is only known by the reader itself. The public verification key of the
CA is embedded in each privacy-preserving identity card issued and can be used to check
the validity of a certificate.
As illustrated in the scenario, ideally the privacy-preserving identity card system should
fulfill the following properties:
• No personal information leakage: in order to protect the privacy of the user, the card
should disclose as little information as possible about him. Ideally, the only thing the
card should reveal is one bit of information proving (or disproving) a binary state-
ment concerning the user.
• Unlinkability: it should not be possible to trace and link the actions of the user of the
card. For instance, even if the user proves the same statement at different occasions,
it should be impossible to link the different statements as being made by the same
user.
• Correctness: a binary statement proven by the user with the help of the privacy-
preserving identity card should always5 be valid. For instance, the user should never
be able to prove false statements about himself by cheating the system (soundness
property). Moreover if the verifier is honest, he should always accept a binary state-
ment about the user provided that this statement is true and the user possesses the
corresponding credentials (completeness property).
• Non-transferability: only the legitimate user should be able to use his privacy-preser–
ving identity card to prove statements about himself to other entities. Otherwise, the
user could be the victim of identity theft if he loses his card or even sell for some
money the use of his privacy-preserving identity card to somebody else, thus delib-
erately transferring his privileges or even his identity to illegitimate users.
• Authenticity and unforgeability: it should be impossible to counterfeit the identity card
of a user and to usurp his role, or to forge a fake card that corresponds to an arbitrary
chosen identity. Moreover, it should be impossible for an adversary to impersonate
the role of a valid privacy-preserving identity card or a valid reader.
Apart from these fundamental requirements, the privacy-preserving identity card may
also satisfy additional properties that can be desirable in some cases, such as:
4The question can be a Boolean expression with AND, OR and NOT operators and with operands that are
attributes of the owner, which can be verified according to data stored in the card.
5In this paper, when we use the terms “always” or “never”, it means respectively that this event occurs or
does not occur, except with negligible probability (for instance exponentially small with respect to a security
parameter). In the same manner, in all this paper we consider that an adversary has only bounded computational
power.
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• Optional anonymity removing: the actions of the user should stay anonymous6 at all
times, except in some scenarios where it might be necessary to remove his anonymity
for serious reasons. For instance in an extreme situation, it could happen that a crime
(such as a murder) has been perpetrated in a room that has been accessed by only
one person using a privacy-preserving identity card. In this situation, the certification
authority and the verifiermaywant to collaborate in order to lift the anonymity of this
person (i.e. retrieving the identity of the owner of the card that has been used). On
the other hand, although the possibility of lifting the anonymity is desirable in some
scenarios, it could decrease the confidence of the user in his belief that his privacy is
indeed protected by the card.
• Transparency and explicit consent: in order to increase the trust of the user in the system,
the card could monitor the questions that it has been asked and display them to the
user. Ideally, the privacy-preserving identity card should not be considered by the
user as a black-box that magically protects his privacy, but rather he should have the
possibility to view the history of interactions of the card with external readers. It is
even possible to imagine, that for some questions that are deemed critical regarding
the privacy of the user, his confirmation may be asked before the privacy-preserving
identity card replies to the question.
3 Related Work
Our proposal for the privacy-preserving national identity card is close in spirit to the project
PRIME7 (PRivacy and Identity Management for Europe) [31], whose goal was to develop
a framework and tools allowing a user to manage his identity and to protect his privacy
in the cyberspace. Indeed, the main purpose of the privacy-preserving identity card is to
enable a person to conduct tasks in the real world without having to disclose his identity,
whereas PRIME was focusing exclusively on the online setting. The informal proposition
of Birch for a possible future U.K. national identity card [5], called Psychic ID, also shares
several privacy features with our proposal. Indeed, the Psychic ID card respects the princi-
ple of data minimization and only reveals to a reader (or visually to an entitled person) the
minimal information concerning the user that is needed for a specific purpose if the user
possesses the corresponding credential, and nothing otherwise. Before that Psychic ID ac-
cepts to answer a particular question, first the reader has to show a credential that attests of
its right to ask this question. In a recent report [21], ENISA has analyzed the specifications
of existing electronic identity cards in Europe with respect to some privacy requirements,
and this analysis shows that no existing card fulfills all privacy requirements, in particular
concerning unlinkability and minimal information disclosure.
Other related works close to our approach include a protocol for the partial revelation
of information related to certified identity proposed by Boudot [8] and the development
of a cryptographic framework for the controlled release of certified data due to Bangerter,
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [1].
In Boudot’s scheme [8], a certified version of the personal information of a user is stored
on a smartcard. This certification takes the form of a signature obtained from the CA.When
6This means that no information other than a binary statement should be disclosed by the use of the card. In
some cases, such as when checking the validity of a boarding pass, the binary statement is a confirmation of the
name and first name of the user (read from the boarding pass).
7https://www.prime-project.eu/
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the user wants to prove some property related to its identity, he starts by sending a com-
mitment of this information to the verifier and then issues a zero-knowledge proof that this
information is certified and that it respects some property. For instance, it can be used to
prove that the committed value lies within some interval (e.g. that Alice’s age is between
18 and 25 years old). The protocol proposed by Boudot is based on the Fujisaki-Okamoto
commitment scheme [23] and is secure under the strong RSA assumption. The privacy-
preserving proof of statements (Section 7.2) that we used in our second proposal for im-
plementation of the privacy-preserving national identity card was inspired from Boudot’s
seminal paper.
In the framework of Bangerter, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [1], the user possesses a cer-
tificate containing his personal data that has been signed by the CA. When the user inter-
acts with a verifier, he can choose which parts of the certificate he wants to disclose and
also prove some property such that a particular value stored in the certificate lies within
some interval (much like in Boudot’s work). Contrary to traditional certificates, the pro-
posed protocol allows for multiple show unlinkability as the user can prove several times
the same statement to the same verifier without the possibility for the verifier to link these
different proofs to the same entity. While under normal circumstances, the verifier only
learns partial information relative to the user due to the selective disclosure, the proposed
scheme also include a mechanism which reveals the identity of the user with respect to a
particular interaction (i.e. lift his anonymity). This mechanism requires an active coopera-
tion between the verifier and the authority who has issued the certificates. The framework
also enables to prove relationships between different committed data.
4 Enabling technologies
Enforcing in reality the properties of the privacy-preserving identity card require the com-
bination of several hardware and cryptographic techniques that we briefly review in this
section.
4.1 Smartcards
A smartcard is a plastic card with an embedded integrated circuit that contains some dedi-
cated memory cells and a microprocessor that can process data stored in the memory cells
or exchanged with a reader through serial link connections (for contact smartcards), or
through radio links (for contactless smartcards). The memory cells can only be accessed
by the microprocessor. The main purpose of the smartcard is to assure the confidentiality
and integrity of the information stored on the card. For that, the smartcard must satisfy
inherent tamper-proof properties (to protect the microprocessor and the memory) as well
as some resistance against physical attacks and side channel analysis8 [2]. As in cryptology,
there is an ongoing race in the smartcard world between the developers of attacks and the
designers of countermeasures (see [32] for instance).
Nowadays, smartcards are widely used around the world, especially in mobile phones,
tokens for public transport systems or for other applications such as electronic payments.
Until now, smartcards used in practice have relied mostly on symmetric encryption9, by
8The same kind of tamper-proofness techniques can be applied to USB keys, smartcard readers or other hard-
ware devices for similar purposes.
9This assertion is true at least for low-cost smartcards, even if public-key cryptosystems are available on most
of recent smartcards, including Java Cards.
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using algorithms such as triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) or CRYPTO-110. Calmels,
Canard, Girault and Sibert have recently suggested to move instead to asymmetric encryp-
tion in the future for RFID tags, both for security and practical reasons [12]. They have
also described a low-cost version of a group signature scheme thus suggesting that such
cryptographic primitive are possible even with inexpensive smartcard technologies. Even
more recently, Bichsel, Camenisch, Groß and Shoup have conducted an empirical evalua-
tion of the implementation of an anonymous credential system [4] (which is based on the
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme [14]) on JavaCards (standard 2.2.1). The imple-
mentation was using a RSA encryption with a modulus of 1536 bits and was autonomous
in the sense that the smartcard was not delegating computations to the terminal or another
possibly untrusted hardware. Their experiment was successful in showing that anony-
mous credential are within the reach of current technology as they obtained running time
in the order of 10 seconds (which is several order of magnitude lower than previous imple-
mentations). Of course, for a user this time may still be too long and inconvenient for some
practical applications but this is likely to improve in the future with new advances in the
smartcard technology11.
4.2 Anonymous Credentials
An anonymous credential is a cryptographic token that allows a user to prove statements
about himself to verifiers anonymously. Anonymous credentials are generally based on
zero-knowledge type of proofs [24] and enable the user to prove his accreditation to the ver-
ifier without revealing any additional information (such as his identity). The first system
of anonymous credential has been proposed by Chaum [16] and is based on the idea that
each organization might know the same user by a different pseudonym. The organizations
cannot combine their data on a particular user because they are unable to link two differ-
ent pseudonyms to the same person. Private credentials can be derived from other creden-
tials and used to prove relationships between credentials/attributes/organizations with-
out having the risk of linking the different pseudonyms. For instance, Alice might want to
prove anonymously to the public transport company that she is a student in order to get
a discount on monthly travel fees. In this example, Alice wants to transfer her credentials
granted by the university (organization A) to the public transport company (organization
B) without revealing her identity.
Credentials can be one-show (as it is the case for e-cash) or multiple shows. When a user
shows multiple times the same credential, this raises the concern of linkability if several ac-
tions can be traced to a unique user (even anonymous). Brands has designed efficient proto-
cols for proving relations among committed values [10] which form the basis of the U-Prove
anonymous credential system. However, these techniques do not display multiple-show
unlinkability. One possibility for preventing this is to issue multiple one-show credentials
to the same user. Another solution is to use a group signature schemewhich allows multiple-
show unlinkability. Group signature schemes [17] have been introduced by Chaum and
van Heyst to provide anonymity to the signer of a message. For that, there is a single pub-
lic verification key for the group, but each member of the group receives a different private
signing key from the group manager (who could be for instance the CA). A group signa-
10CRYPTO-1 is a proprietary encryption algorithm from NXP Semiconductors used mainly for applications
in contactless cards, such as the MIFARE RFID tags. The security of this encryption scheme has been almost
completely broken by a serie of recent attacks highlighted in the security community.
11For instance, Bichsel, Camenisch, Groß and Shoup have used a Java Card with a 3.57 MHz 8-bits processor
[4], while some smartcards exist with 32-bits processors running at 66 MHz (e.g., the Infineon SLE 88CF4000P).
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 3 (2010)
A Proposal for a Privacy-preserving National Identity Card 259
ture scheme (with optional anonymity removing) consists in general of the four following
operations:
• Registration of the user. During the Join operation, the CA assigns to the user a new
private signature key, which we denote by SKGU .
• Signature of a message in behalf of the group. The SignGroup operation takes as input a
message m and signing key SKGU and produces a signature σG,U (m) on this mes-
sage.
• Verification of a group signature. The VerifySignGroup operation allows to check the
validity of a group signature. It requires as input a verification key for the group
V KG, which has been setup by the CA and is publicly known, as well as a message
m and a group signature on this message σG,U (m). VerifySignGroup produces as
output either accept or reject depending on the validity of the signature.
• Anonymity removing. From the point of view of the verifier, it is impossible to dis-
tinguish if two group signatures come from the same individual or not. However in
exceptional situations, the CA can (in association with the verifier) retrieve the iden-
tity of a particular signer via the LiftAnonymity operation. This operation takes as
input a message m and a group signature on this message σG,U (m) and produce as
output the identity of the signer U. In practice, this is often done by first identifying
the private signature key SKGU from the signature and then retrieving the identity
associated to this key.
The IdentityMixer (Idemix) project from IBMand the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA)
protocol [11] adopted for the anonymous authentification of Trusted Computing Platform
(TPM) are two famous examples of anonymous credentials based on the concept of group
signature.
Another possibility for implementing anonymous credentials is to use a non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof [3] in combination with a commitment scheme. A commitment scheme
is characterized by two operations:
• Commitment phase. During this phase, the Commit operation takes as input a value a
and some auxiliary information aux (which corresponds generally to some form of
randomness) and produces comm(a) which is a commitment to this particular value
a.
• Opening phase. The Open operation takes as input a commitment comm(a) and some
auxiliary information aux and reveals as output a, the committed value.
A commitment scheme is perfectly binding if there is only one a that corresponds to a par-
ticular commitment comm(a) (i.e., an adversary cannot open a commitment to several val-
ues), and computationally hiding if an adversary with bounded computational power cannot
open a particular commitment without the knowledge of the auxiliary information. Sup-
pose that a prover stores a particular value a and the CA’s signature on it, σCA(a), which
certifies its validity. The prover may want to show that this value respects a particular bi-
nary statement f to a verifier in a zero-knowledgemanner. To realize that, the prover sends
to the verifier comm(a) ← Commit(a, aux), which is a commitment to the value a. Then,
the prover issues pi ← Prove((a, σCA(a), aux)|VerifySign(a, σCA(a), V KCA) = accept ∧ a =
Open(comm(a), aux) ∧ f(a) = true), which is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that
the prover knows (a, σCA(a),aux) such that (1) σCA(a) is a valid signature of the CA on
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a (verified by using V KCA, the public verification key of the CA); and (2) the committed
value of comm(a) is effectively a; and (3) the value a respects the binary statement f .
4.3 Biometric Authentication
The biometric profile of a person is composed of a combination of some physical features
that uniquely characterize him. For instance, a biometric feature can be a fingerprint or a
picture of the iris. The biometric data of an individual is a part of his identity just as his
name or his address. As such biometrics can be used for the purpose of identification (i.e.,
identifying a particular individual in a list of registered people) or authentication (verifying
that the person claiming an identity is indeed the one who has been registered with this
identity).
In order to verify that an individual corresponds to some registered biometric profile, a
fresh sample of his biometric data is generally taken and compared with the stored tem-
plate using a matching algorithm. The matching algorithm computes a dissimilarity (or
distance) measure that indicates how far are the two biometric samples. Two biometric
samples are considered to belong to the same individual if their dissimilarity is below some
well-chosen threshold, which is dependant of the natural variability within the population.
A good biometric strategy tries to find a compromise between false acceptance rate or FAR
(wrongly recognizing the individual as a particular registered user) and the false rejection
rate or FRR (being unable to recognize the registered user). An example of biometric data
is the picture of the iris that can be transformed/coded into a vector of 512 bytes called the
IrisCode. Afterwards, it is fairly simple to evaluate the dissimilarity between two code-
words just by computing the Hamming distance between these two vectors.
As the biometric features of an individual is an inherent part of his identity, several tech-
niques have been developed to avoid storing explicitly the biometric profile while keeping
the possibility of using it for authentication. For instance, the main idea of cancellable bio-
metrics [33] is to apply a distortion to the biometric template such that (a) it is not easy to
reconstruct the original template from the distorted version and (b) the transformation pre-
serves the distance between two templates. Other techniques have been proposed which
combine the use of error-correcting codes and hash function such as the fuzzy commitment
scheme [28] that we summarize here. For the sake of clarity, we assume that b, the biometric
profile of the user, can be represented as a binary vector of length n (i.e., b ∈ {0, 1}n)12. An
error-correcting code C of size n is chosen such that it can correct up to t errors where t is
chosen empirically so as to lead to a good trade-off between FAR and FRR. A hash func-
tion h is also used by the protocol. The fuzzy commitment scheme [28] can be applied to
biometric authentication on a smartcard, with two operations:
• Enrollment phase. During this phase, the biometric template b is measured through the
Enroll operation. A codeword c is drawn uniformly at random from C and z = c⊕ b
is computed. The hashed version of this codeword h(c) as well as z are stored on the
card.
• Verification phase. When the card wants to verify that the user is the owner of the card,
the biometric sensor device13 measures a fresh biometric sample b′ and sends it to the
card at the beginning of the Verify operation. Afterwards, the card computes z ⊕ b′
12In practice, this might not be true when the matching of templates relies on geometric information (for in-
stance in fingerprints), in which case the error-correcting approach has to be adapted to the particular situation.
13Such a sensor can be implemented on the smartcard itself, but in practice it may also be part of the smartcard
reader device.
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and decodes this towards the nearest codeword c′. The card then calculates h(c′) and
accepts the user if h(c′) = h(c) and rejects him otherwise.
In the same spirit as the fuzzy commitment scheme, a cryptographic primitive known as
fuzzy extractor has been developed in the recent years (see for instance the survey [19]).
This primitive allows to extract a uniformly distributed random string rand ∈ {0, 1}l 14
from a biometric template b in a noise-tolerant manner such that if the input changes to
some b′ close to b (i.e. dist(b, b′) < t), the string rand can still be recovered exactly. The
dissimilarity measure dist can be for instance the Hamming distance, the set difference
or the edit distance [19]. When initialized for the first time, a fuzzy extractor outputs a
helper string called p ∈ {0, 1}∗, which will be part of the input of subsequent calls to the
fuzzy extractor in order to help in reconstructing rand. The string p has the property that
it can be made public without decreasing the security of rand. Formally, a fuzzy extractor
consists of two operations:
• Generation phase. During the first use of the fuzzy extractor, the operation Generate
takes as input a biometric template b and produces as output a uniform random string
rand and a helper string p.
• Retrieval phase. The operation Retrieve takes as input a biometric profile b′ which is
close to the original profile b (i.e. dist(b, b′) < t) as well as the helper string p and
produces as output the random string rand.
One application of fuzzy extractors is the possibility of using the biometric input of the user
as a key to encrypt and authenticate the user’s data. For instance, rand can act as an en-
cryption key which can be retrieved only by the combination of the user’s biometric profile
and the helper string. As rand is never explicitly stored and the user’s biometrics acts as
a key, this guarantees that only if the correct biometric template is presented, the record of
the user can be decrypted. Regarding the practical applicability of these technologies, Hao,
Anderson and Daugman [26] have demonstrated that by relying on Iris code for biometric
authentication, it is possible to retrieve up to 140 random bits of key (more than needed
for a 128 bits AES key), while displaying very low rates of false acceptance (0%) and false
rejection (0.47%).
5 Operation andUse of the Privacy-preserving Identity Card
Security assumptions. We assume that the privacy-preserving identity card is a contact
smartcard that has sufficient resistance against physical and logical attacks (see Section
4.1). This requirement of tamper-resistance is essential for the security of our first imple-
mentation proposal for the privacy-preserving identity card, BasicPIC (see Section 6). This
requirement can be relaxed by using fuzzy extractors for our extended proposal, Extended-
PIC (see Section 7). We also assume that the smartcard reader device that will interact with
the privacy-preserving identity card possesses similar tamper-proof properties. However,
if this assumption fails for the reader, the consequences may not be as disastrous as for
the identity card. For instance, if an adversary can break the tamper-resistance of a reader,
this mainly means he can have access to its private decryption key and its certificate. This
14In the basic version, l, the length of the random string generated, is smaller than n, the length of the biometric
profile. However, this is not really a problem as it is possible to use rand as a seed of a good pseudorandom
number generator to generate an almost uniformly random string of arbitrary size.
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would give enough information for an adversary to produce clones of the reader (thus im-
personating a genuine reader) but as such cannot be used to forge a fake privacy-preserving
identity card or to obtain more information from the card than the genuine reader.
The smartcard contains a processor that can compute efficiently cryptographic primitives
such as (pseudo-) random number generation15, asymmetric encryption and group signa-
ture scheme. The reader is also assumed to have at least the same cryptographic abili-
ties. The card memory stores identity data similar to those printed on existing identity
cards (e.g., names, date and location of birth, address, etc.), plus biometric data and other
security-related information, such as public and private keys. We assume that the acquisi-
tion during the biometric authentication is done via a trusted sensor that is either directly
integrated on the card or on a remote terminal. In this latter case besides the tamper-
resistance assumption on the sensor, we also need to assume the availability of a secure
channel between the biometric sensor and the card. With regard to practical issues, we
recommend to rely either on a strong biometric such as the iris recognition, which is quite
difficult to counterfeit, or the combination of a weak biometric such as fingerprint16 with
a PIN. However, this adds another assumption than the keyboard needed for entering the
PIN needs also to be trusted and than the communication between this keyboard and the
card needs to be done through a secure channel (unless the keyboard is directly integrated
on the card).
High-level view of the protocol and use of the card. When the smartcard is inserted into
a reader device, the smartcard processor initiates a mutual authentication between the card
and the reader (Section 6.2) for the reader to be sure that the card has been issued by a CA
and for the card to be sure that the reader has a genuine certificate. If the mutual authen-
tication fails, the smartcard is not activated (i.e., its processor does nothing). Contrarily,
when the mutual authentication succeeds, the embedded processor initiates a biometric ver-
ification of the user (Section 6.3), by using for instance the fuzzy commitment scheme for
biometric authentication described in Section 4.3. Finally, when the biometric authentica-
tion is successful, the processor initiates a question-response protocol with the reader device
(Section 6.4).
In practice, the question asked by the reader could be any binary query related to an
attribute of the user, such as:
• “Is the user a Finnish citizen?” (for instance when crossing the border),
• “Is the user under 18 years old?” (when proving that the user is within some age
interval),
• “Is the user firstname Alice?” (when checking the identity before boarding a plane)
or
• “Is the user an inhabitant of Toulouse?” (when accessing a local service restricted to
municipality residents).
The question could also be a Boolean expression on several attributes of the user (for in-
stance “Is the user under 18 years old OR over 60 years old ANDan inhabitant of Toulouse?”).
15Note that a hardware-based random number generator is integrated in most of the current Java Cards (e.g.,
Oberthur ID-One Cosmo 32 v5, NXP JCOP v2.2/41, SHC1206, . . . ).
16We called a fingerprint a “weak biometric” because it can be collected and copied much more easily (for
instance through simple “wax finger” techniques) than a “strong biometric” such as the iris for which the recog-
nition process may involved the observation of the behaviour of the iris under chosen lighting conditions. Note
also that it is possible to mitigate the threat of biometric cloning by using mechanisms checking the liveness condi-
tion.
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If the question-response protocol is implemented through an anonymous credential sys-
tem that is expressive enough to prove any combination of the logical operations AND,
OR and NOT, regarding the attributes of the user then it is possible in principle to check
any particular binary statement regarding his identity. This is similar to a recent work by
Camenisch and Thomas [15], which provides an efficient implementation of anonymous
credentials that allows to prove AND, OR and NOT statements regarding the attributes en-
coded. Even in the situation where the reader is allowed to ask a complex binary question
related to several attributes of the user (as specified in the reader’s certificate issued by the
CA), the reader only learns one bit of information through this interaction with the card. Of
course, this would not be case if the reader was allowed instead to ask several elementary
binary queries and compute itself the Boolean expression.
Note that the role of the card is mainly to certify a binary statement related to personal
data stored in the card, corresponding to a question that the reader is authorized to ask.
For that:
• The readermust already know the values of the attributes (or their ranges) concerned
by its question.
• These values are either constant, built-in the reader (e.g., under 18 or over 60) or al-
ready available in the real world (e.g., the name of the passenger written on a board-
ing pass).
• In all cases, the disclosed personal information is minimal and it corresponds to the
information necessary for the reader to performs the check it is designed and autho-
rized to do.
There is however an inherent limitation on how far the unlinkability property can be
pushed in a world where several organizations starts to record all the interactions they
had with users through anonymous credentials and in which contexts these interactions
occured, and pool this data together [22, 30]. Consider for instance, the scenario where a
teenager has to prove to a theater that he is less than 18 years old in order to get a discount
and then that 2 hours later (right after the end of the movie), he proved to the nearby swim-
ming pool that he is less than 18 years old and he is an inhabitant of Toulouse (where the
swimming pool is located) to get the lowest price for the entry ticket. In this scenario, even
if the teenager proves the two statements related to his identity in a theoretically anony-
mous and unlinkable way, it may happen if the theater and the swimming pool collude
that they are able to infer that the identity behind the two statements has a non-negligible
probability to be the same individual.
6 Basic Implementation
The first implementation of the privacy-preserving identity card that we proposed com-
bines the different technologies and concepts briefly reviewed in Section 4. We call it Ba-
sicPIC, which stands forBasic implementation of aPrivacy-preserving IdentityCard (PIC).
In this implementation, we suppose that the smartcard tamper-proofness is “sufficient”. In
practice however, it is quite likely that if an adversary spends enough resources and time,
he will be able to break the tamper proof characteristics of the smartcard and then read
and/or modify the information stored on it. We address this issue by proposing a more
complex implementation, called ExtendedPIC, in the next section.
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We note that our BasicPIC proposal is similar in spirit to other approaches to biometrics-
based non-transferable anonymous credentials, such as the seminal paper by Bleumer [7]
and subsequent work by Implagliazzo and More [27]. The main idea behind all these ap-
proaches is to combine the use of biometric authentication with physical security by means
of a tamper-resistant token responsible for storing the credentials. If the biometric authen-
tication is not successful, then the physical token refuses to use the credentials it possesses,
thus ensuring the property of non-transferability.
6.1 Initialisation
When the user wishes to acquire a new privacy-preserving identity card, he goes to an
Registration Authority (RA) who can verify the personal data of the user and register the
request. We denote by a1, . . . , ak, the k attributes of the user that embody his identity. For
instance, the ith attribute ai could be a name (string of characters value), a year of birth (in-
teger value) or an address (mix of strings of characters and integers). After having checked
the identity and other claimed attributes of the user, the RA scans the user’s biometric pro-
file b (which could be for instance his fingerprints, the map of his iris or the template of
his voice) and computes h(c), z ← Enroll(b), where z = b ⊕ c for c a random codeword
of C and h(c) a hashed version of it. The RA sends z and h(c) in a secure manner along
with the personal information of the user to the Certification Authority (CA). The secure
transmission of the personal information of the user between the RA and the CA is done by
communicating over an electronic secure channel or via a physical delivery whose process
is under strict monitoring.
The CA is responsible for issuing the privacy-preserving identity card. The CA performs
the Join operation (see Section 4.2) to generate the signing key SKGU of the user for the
group signature. This key is stored within the tamper-proof smartcard that is the core of
the privacy-preserving identity card. The attributes of the user a1, . . . , ak as well as z, h(c)
and V KCA (the public verification key of the CA) are also stored as cleartext inside the
card. For an external observer, the card is “blank” and looks exactly the same as any other
privacy-preserving identity card. The exact form of the smartcard can vary, depending on
the chosen trade-off between the individual cost of each card that we are willing to spend
and the assumptions we make on the time and means that the adversary is able to deploy.
If the technology is affordable, the card could possess a biometric sensor17 and a screen.
The screen could display for instance the identifier of the reader and the questions asked
to the card.
Before an organization can use a reader device able to interact with privacy-preserving
identity cards, the organization needs first to register the device to the CA. The CA then
emits a credential cr in the form of “This reader is allowed to ask the question f to a privacy-
preserving identity card. The answer to this question has to be encrypted using the public
encryption key EKR.”. The public encryption key EKR is supposed to be specific to the
reader and as such can be considered as its identifier18. The CA will certify this credential
by performing Sign(cr, SKCA) which generates σCA(cr), the signature on the credential cr
using the CA secret key. The reader also knows the group verification key V KG which
17Some companies, such as Novacard, have started to sell smartcards integrating a fingerprint sensor directly
on the card since at least 2004. If the privacy-preserving card is integrated within the cell-phone of the user, it is
also possible to imagine that iris recognition could be easily implemented if the cell-phone possesses a camera.
18The reader should also be tamperproof enough to protect its secret decryption key DKR, thus preventing
an attacker to forge cloned readers. In any case, a forged reader would not be able to retrieve more personal
information from the BasicPIC than a genuine reader.
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is public and will be used to check the authenticity of a privacy-preserving identity card
during the group signature.
6.2 Mutual Authenticity Checking
Before the card answers the questions of a particular reader, it needs to ensure that 1) the
reader is an authentic device and 2) it possesses the corresponding credentials. On the
other hand, the reader has to check that the card is a genuine privacy-preserving identity
card but without learning any information related to the identity of the card or its user.
Regarding the scheme used for signing the credential, any standard signature scheme such
as DSA or ECDSA can be used to implement this functionality in practice. Efficient im-
plementation of group signature with optional anonymity withdrawal exist such as the
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme [14] which is proven secure in the random or-
acle model under the strong RSA assumption. The mutual authenticity checking scheme
we propose is inspired by the “simplified TLS key transport protocol” presented in [9]. It
consists of 4 rounds of communication:
1. During the first round, the card generates a random string of bits r1 and sends it in
clear to the reader.
2. During the second round, the reader sends in clear to the card a randomly generated
string of bits r2, its credential cr as well as the signature of the CA on this credential
σCA(cr). The card then checks if the function VerifySign(cr, σCA(cr), V KCA) returns
accept, in which case the card goes to the third round, or reject and the card aborts
the protocol. The card should have a built-in mechanism that limits the number of
attempts that a reader may try within some time window so as to counter brute force
attacks.
3. At the beginning of the third round, the card generates dynamically a random string
PMK (called the pre-master secret) and computes from it KCR = MACPMK(r1||r2)
using a message authentication code (MAC) in which PMK plays the role of the se-
cret key. KCR will serve as a session key for a symmetric cryptosystem (such as AES).
It needs to be recomputed also by the reader, and thus PMK must be transmitted by
the card to the reader, encrypted by the reader’s public key EKR (retrieved by the
card from the readers credential cr): ciph1 ← Encrypt(PMK,EKR). The card also
computes σG,U (h(r1||r2||ciph1)), which corresponds to a group signature on the hash
of themessage composed of the concatenation of r1, r2 and ciph1. The card then sends
to the reader ciph1 and σG,U (h(r1||r2||ciph1)). IfVerifySignGroup(h(r1||r2||ciph1), σG,U
(h(r1||r2||ciph1)), V KG) has for outcome reject, the reader aborts the protocol. Oth-
erwise, the reader recognizes the card has a genuine one. Afterwards, the reader de-
crypts the first part of the message by performingDecrypt(ciph1, DKR)which reveals
PMK and from it the reader can deduceKCR = MACPMK(r1||r2).
4. During the fourth round, the reader computes the encryption ciph2← EncryptSym
(h(r1||r2||ciph1||σG,U (h(r1||r2||ciph1)),KCR))), which is the encryption under a sym-
metric cryptosystem of the message h(r1||r2||ciph1||σG,U(h(r1||r2||ciph1)) (i.e. the
hash of all the messages exchanged so far with the exception of its credential) under
the keyKCR and sends it to the card. Finally, the card can decrypt it using the shared
keyKCR and verifies the consistency of h(r1||r2||ciph1||σG,U (h(r1||r2||ciph1)) will all
the messages exchanged so far. If this verification fails, the card aborts the protocols
whereas otherwise the mutual authenticity checking is considered successful.
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Suppose that the reader stores in a list all the pairs of message sequences and group
signatures (h(r1||r2||ciph1), σG,U(h(r1||r2||ciph1))) that he has seen along with other in-
formation such as a time stamp. As such this list is of no use for it to break the pri-
vacy of users as it is not even able to recognize if two different signatures belong to the
same individual or not. However in some extreme situation where there is a clear neces-
sity of lifting the anonymity of a particular signature, the reader may hand over the pair
(h(r1||r2||ciph1), σG,U(h(r1||r2||ciph1))) to the CA which will be able to retrieve SKGU by
performing LiftAnonymity(h(r1||r2||ciph1), σG,U(h(r1||r2||ciph1))) and thus also the identity
of U .
6.3 Biometric Verification
The privacy-preserving identity card is activated by the verification of the biometrics of
its user. During this phase, a fresh biometric sample b′ of the user is acquired by the bio-
metric sensor and sent to the card, which then performs the Verify operation upon it. This
operation consists in computing z ⊕ b′, decoding this towards the nearest codeword c′ and
calculating h(c′) to the card. The outcome of Verify is either accept or reject depending on
whether or not h(c′) = h(c). If the user passes the verification test, the card is considered
activated and enter the question-response protocol. Otherwise, the card refuses to answer
to external communication.
6.4 Question-Response Protocol
Let f(ai) be the binary answer to a Boolean question f about the user’s attribute ai (or
a combination of attributes). For instance, the semantic of the bit f(ai) could be true if
its value is 1 and false if its value is 0. The question f as well as the public encryp-
tion key EKR of the reader have been transmitted as part of the credential cr. First, the
card concatenates the answer bit f(ai) with the common secret shared with the reader
KCR that was generated during the mutual authentication phase to obtain f(ai)||KCR
and signs it, which generates σG,U (f(ai)||KCR). The card computes the cipher ciph ←
Encrypt(f(ai)||KCR||σG,U (f(ai)||KCR), EKR), where ciph corresponds to the encryption
of the message f(ai)||KCR||σG,U (f(ai)||KCR) with the public key EKR. Afterwards, the
reader decrypts this message by performing Decrypt(ciph,DKR) which reveals f(ai)||KCR
and σG,U (f(ai)||KCR). The reader verifies the validity of the signature σG,U (f(ai)||KCR)
with the verification key of the group and believes the answer f(ai) only if this verification
succeeds. Note that in the implementation BasicPIC , the correctness of answer f(ai) re-
lies partly on the assumption that the card is tamperproof and therefore cannot be made to
misbehave and lie to a question asked by the reader.
The encryption scheme used has to be semantically secure19 in order to avoid the possibil-
ity of an adversary having an advantage in guessing whether the answer of the card to the
reader’s question is 0 or 1. As a semantically secure encryption is necessarily also proba-
bilistic, this ensures that even if the card answers twice to the same question it will not be
possible for an eavesdropper to distinguish whether these two answers where produced by
the same privacy-preserving identity card or two different cards. In the above protocol, we
19Ideally, the encryption scheme should even fulfill a stronger security requirement called indistinguishability
under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) (see [34] for instance). This property has been proven to also
guarantee the non-malleability property and thus counters the threat of an adversary flipping the bit of the answer
transmitted.
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have adopted the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [18] which has been one of the first proven
to satisfy the IND-CAA2 property.
6.5 Analysis of the Implementation
In this Section, we will describe informally why the implementation BasicPIC fulfills the
desiderata of a privacy-preserving identity card (as listed in Section 2) and analyze its cost.
In details, the implementation BasicPIC respects the following properties:
• No personal information leakage: due its tamper-proof aspect, the attributes describing
the user are safely stored on the smartcard and only one bit of information regarding
the user is revealed every time the card answers a question.
• Unlinkability: the use of a group signature prevents the possibility of linking the
proofs of two different statements to the same user. Moreover, there is no such thing
as a pseudonym or an identifier used in our description of BasicPIC (with exception
of the group signing key SKGU , which is never disclosed by the card). In particular,
there is no identity card number, which could be used to trace all the uses of the card.
The common shared keyKCR is generated dynamically at random during the session
and has no link with the identity of the card.
• Correctness: in this implementation, the correctness of a statement proven by the card
relies mainly on the fact that the tamper-proof properties of the smartcard forbids
a dishonest user from changing its designed behaviour or the attributes values. In-
deed, the card can be seen as a kind of oracle that never lies to a question asked to it.
To change the behaviour of the oracle would require breaking the smartcard, which
would violate the tamper-proof assumption. Moreover as the answer is encrypted
using a non-malleable asymmetric encryption scheme using the public key of the
reader, it is impossible for a potential adversary to flip the answer bit without being
detected. Finally, as the answer bit is signed with the key of the card, this prevents an
adversary from impersonating a valid card during the question-response protocol.
• Non-transferability: before entering the question-response protocol, the cardwill check
that the current user is effectively the legitimate owner of the card by verifying his
biometrics.
• Authenticity and unforgeability: the reader will prove its authenticity and its right to
ask a particular question by showing the corresponding credential signed by the CA.
The card will prove its authenticity by showing that it can sign a randomly gen-
erated message on the behalf of the group of genuine privacy-preserving identity
cards. Moreover, the card unforgeability is ensured by the tamper-proofness of the
smartcard and the validity of the group signing key assigned by the CA, whereas he
reader’s unforgeability is guaranteed its tamper-proofness and by the validity of the
reader’s credential issued by the CA.
• Optional anonymity removing: in extreme situations, the anonymity of the actions of the
user of a privacy-preserving identity card can be lifted by having the CA cooperating
with a verifier and applying the LiftAnonymity operation on the corresponding pair of
message sequences and associated group signature.
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• Transparency and explicit consent: in most situations, the user expresses his consent
by inserting his card in the reader: we can consider that, since the reader has to be
certified by the CA, it is trustworthy enough, i.e., tamperproof and able to display
correctly the question on a screen (part of the reader). Then if the user accepts the
question, he just confirms it by pushing a switch, else he just withdraws his card from
the reader. If the reader cannot be trusted and if the question can be too sensitive, the
card should be equipped with embedded screen and switch.
Note that one of the biggest threat against the protocol would be aman-in-the-middle attack
where the adversary would sit between a genuine card and genuine reader. For instance,
the adversary might want to prove to a reader a boolean statement that in reality is false
(according to the data stored on the card) or simply break the privacy of the bit answered
by the card. The purpose of the session key is mainly to prevent this kind of attack by
ensuring the authenticity property during the mutual authenticity checking phase (Section
6.2) and during the question-response protocol (Section 6.4).
Moreover, depending on the biometric feature used for the user’s authentication, it might
be more or less difficult for an adversary to acquire a biometric sample of the user and to
create a synthetic prosthesis of it that could be used to pass the biometric verification. For
instance, a fingerprint is much easier to capture (for instance by stealing a glass that was
used by an individual) than the behaviour of an iris under varying lighting conditions. In
the latter case, it is much harder to generate a prosthesis of an artificial iris than that of
a fingerprint. In all cases, if possible with respect to the technology of the card, the ideal
solution would be to integrate several authentication methods into the card to obtain a
stronger authentication mechanism (for instance combining biometric verification + PIN).
Regarding practical considerations, the smartcard used for the implementation of Ba-
sicPIC is required to have some cryptographic capacities such as (1) a (pseudo-)random
number generator, (2) a cryptographic hashing function, (3) a generator for session key
pairs, (4) a semantically secure encryption function, (5) a public-key signature verification
function, (6) a group signature function and (7) an error-correcting code with efficient de-
coding procedures. Current JavaCards already integrate built-in librarieswhich contain op-
timized code for performing requirements (1) to (5) such as for instance SHA-1 for hashing
and DSA for the signature scheme. Efficient versions of group signatures for smartcards,
such as Camenisch-Lysyanskaya [14], also exist and can be implemented with current tech-
nologies as recently shown by Bichsel, Camenisch, Groß and Shoup [4]. Moreover, the
error-correcting codes used to construct the fuzzy commitment schemes generally admit
efficient decoding procedures, which means that the decoding of z⊕ b′ towards the nearest
codeword c′ can also be done efficiently (even if the biometric sensor is directly integrated
within the card). In terms of memory, BasicPIC is quite efficient as it requires to be able to
store the k attributes of the user (space complexity of O(k)), the private signature key of the
card as well as the public verification key of the CA, z whose size is directly proportional
to the biometric template and h(c) which is of constant size.
7 Extended Implementation
The main drawback of BasicPIC is that a great part of its security relies on the tamper-
proof aspect of the smartcard. If this assumption is broken, for instance if the adversary is
able to access the memory of the smartcard, this can greatly endanger some security prop-
erties such as no personal information leakage, authenticity, unforgeability and correctness. To
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overcome this limitation, we propose in this section an extended implementation of the
privacy-preserving identity card that we call ExtendedPIC. The main idea of this imple-
mentation is to complement the functionalities of BasicPIC with the use of fuzzy extractors
to protect the information stored in the card and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs as a
privacy-preserving proof of statements related to the user’s data. More precisely, the prop-
erties of authenticity, unforgeability and non-transferability rely on the fuzzy extractors
while the properties no personal information leakage, unlinkability and correctness are
now provided by the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.
We note that recently Blanton and Hudelson have proposed independently an approach
similar to ours in which the tamper-proofness assumption is also removed by using fuzzy
extractors [6]. In particular even if the integrity of the device holding the credentials is
breached, it is still impossible to recover either the biometric data of the user or his cre-
dentials. The only assumptions that we need to make are that the biometric acquisition
is done through a trusted sensor, which will erase the biometric data it has captured once
the biometric authentication has been completed and that the communication between the
sensor and the card is done through a secure channel. Of course, these assumptions may
be relaxed if the biometric sensor is integrated in the card.
7.1 Initialisation and Authentication
The CA is responsible for signing the user’s information in order to produce the anony-
mous credentials. The credentials emitted by the CA take the form of the CA’s signature on
the attributes of the user. Specifically, we denote these credentials by σCA(a1), . . . , σCA(ak),
where σCA(ai) is the signature on ai, the i
th user attribute, generated by using the CA’s se-
cret key. The operation of the fuzzy extractor Generate is performed on the biometric pro-
file of the user b and produces as output a random string rand and an helper string p. The
random string randwill be used as the key to encrypt20 the attributes of the user, a1, . . . , ak,
and the signatures of the CA on these attributes σCA(a1), . . . , σCA(ak). The attributes and
their associated signatures are stored encrypted inside the card but the helper string p can
be stored in cleartext.
For the sake of simplicity, we can consider that the user signing key SKGU as well as z
and h(c) are stored in cleartext and that the mutual authenticity checking as well as the
biometric verification are performed in the same manner as in BasicPIC (Sections 6.2 and
6.3). In practice however, SKGU should also be encrypted using the key extracted from
the fuzzy extractor, which requires that the biometric profile of the user is acquired first
during the Retrieve operation in order for the mutual authenticity protocol to succeed. In
this situation, it is possible to combine in a natural manner the biometric verification and
the mutual authenticity checking into a single protocol. At the beginning of this protocol,
a fresh template of the current user of the card would be taken and fed as input to the
Retrieve operation along with the helper string p. This would generate an random string
rand′ which would be used as a secret key to decrypt the data stored on the card before
launching the mutual authentication protocol which then proceeds as in the BasicPIC im-
plementation. This protocol would fail if the biometric profile acquired during the Retrieve
operation does not correspond to that of the valid owner of the card (because the private
signature key retrieved would not be valid) or if the card does not possess a valid private
signature key SKGU , which is a form of combination of the biometric verification together
20For example, the encryption scheme can be a symmetric scheme where rand acts as the key for encrypting
and decrypting data and l, the size in bits of rand, can be set to be the size of an AES key (128 or 256 bits).
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with the mutual authentication21.
7.2 Privacy-preserving Proof of Statements
In our setting, the card wants to prove to the reader some function related to the attributes
of the user and also that these attributes have been signed (certified) by the CA. However,
we want to go beyond simply sending an answer bit, by issuing a zero-knowledge proof.
This can be done as follows:
1. We suppose that the binary question asked by the reader is related to the ith attribute
of the user. The card performs Retrieve by taking as input a fresh biometric sample
of the user b′ and the helper string p stored on the card. The output of the Retrieve
operation is the random string rand which is used as a key to decrypt the values of
the attribute ai and its associated signature σCA(ai) from their encrypted versions
stored on the card.
2. The card computes comm(ai) ← Commit(ai, aux), where comm(ai) is a commitment
on the value of the ith attribute ai and aux is some auxiliary information needed to
open the commitment. In practice, we propose to use the Groth-Sahai commitment
scheme [25], which is perfectly binding (thus forbidding that the card can change af-
terwards the value of the attribute committed and therefore prove a false statement)
and computationally hiding (thus preventing a reader to learn the value of the at-
tribute committed unless he can break some computational assumption).
3. The card computes pi ← Prove((ai, σCA(ai), aux)|VerifySign(ai, σCA(ai), V KCA) =
accept ∧ ai = Open(comm(ai), aux) ∧ f(ai) = true), where V KCA is the public ver-
ification key of the CA that can be used to check the validity of the CA’s signature,
σ(ai) is the signature by the CA of attribute ai and f(ai) is a Boolean question re-
garding ai. Effectively, pi is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of the following
statement “The user of this privacy-preserving identity card knows how to open the
commitment comm to some value ai, and this value has been signed by the CA, and
when the Boolean function f is computed on ai it returns true” which could be sum-
marized as “The CA certifies that the user of this privacy-preserving identity card
satisfies the Boolean question f when it is applied on his ith attribute”. The Boolean
question f could be any binary property related to an attribute of the user. Moreover,
by negating ¬(f(ai) = true) in the expression of the zero-knowledge proof, it is pos-
sible to prove that f(ai) = false (i.e., that the Boolean function f returns false when
it is applied on his ith attribute). The idea of using a zero-knowledge proof can also
be extended so as to prove a Boolean expression regarding several attributes at the
same time.
4. The card sends Encrypt(comm||pi,EKR) to the reader which then decrypts it and ver-
ifies the validity of the proof and outputs accept or reject.
For the practical implementation of the privacy-preserving proof of statements, we suggest
to use the recent non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs developed by Belenkiy, Chase,
Kohlweiss and Lysyanskaya [3]. These proofs are an extension of the CL-signatures [14]
and have been proven secure on the common reference string model. These non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs are based partly on the Groth-Sahai commitment scheme [25] that
21In this protocol, the fuzzy commitment scheme is nomore used, being replaced instead by the fuzzy extractor.
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has some interesting non-trivial properties such as being f -extractable, which means it is
possible to prove that the committed value satisfies a certain property without revealing
the value itself, and allows randomizability, which means that a fresh independent proof pi′
of the same statement related to the committed value can be issued from a previous proof pi
of this statement. In the context of the privacy-preserving identity card, the f -extractability
property allows to show that an attribute of the user satisfies some binary property without
disclosing the attribute itself whereas the randomizability property ensures that even if the
card prove several times the same statement, the reader will see each time a different proof
of this statement, thus avoiding the risk of linkability between them.
7.3 Analysis of the Implementation
The implementation ExtendedPIC fulfills the desiderata of a privacy-preserving identity
card as it respects the following properties:
• No personal information leakage: the attributes of the user are stored in the smartcard
encrypted and can only be decrypted if the user biometric profile is presented as
input to the fuzzy extractor in conjunction with the helper string. Moreover, the card
answers a question asked by the reader by showing a non-interactive zero knowledge
proof which leaks nothing but one bit of information about the validity of a particular
binary statement.
• Unlinkability: the use of a group signature prevents the possibility of linking the
proofs of two different statements to the same user. Moreover, there is no such thing
as a pseudonym or an identifier used in our description of ExtendedPIC (with ex-
ception of the group signing key SKGU , which is never disclosed by the card). The
randomizability property of the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof also ensures
that even if the card proves several times the same statement, the proofs generated
will be different and look as if they were independent.
• Correctness: the correctness of a statement proven by the card is a direct consequence
of the soundness and completeness properties of the non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof used. Moreover as the answer is encrypted using a non-malleable asymmetric
encryption scheme using the public key of the reader, it is impossible for a potential
adversary to flip the answer bit without being detected.
• Non-transferability: before its activation, the card will check that the current user is ef-
fectively the legitimate owner of the card by verifying his biometrics. The biometric
template of the user is also used as an input to the fuzzy extractor when it is time
to decrypt the data stored on the card during the privacy-preserving proof of state-
ments. As a consequence, without the presentation of a valid biometric sample of the
user it is impossible to unlock the credentials stored on the card.
• Authenticity and unforgeability: the reader will prove its authenticity and its right to
ask a particular question by showing the corresponding credential signed by the CA.
The card will prove its authenticity by showing that it can sign a randomly generated
message on the behalf of the group of genuine privacy-preserving identity cards, and
also indirectly by showing the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that it possesses
the signature of CA on the attributes of the user. The unforgeability is ensured by the
tamper-proofness of the smartcard, as well as the fact that the data of the user is
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stored encrypted on the card, plus by the verification of the credential issued by the
CA and the signatures of the CA on the attributes of the user.
• Optional anonymity removing, transparency and explicit consent: these properties are en-
sured in the same manner than for the implementation BasicPIC (see Section 5.5 for
more details).
The ExtendedPIC implementation is clearly more demanding in terms of ressources than
the BasicPIC one, the most costly part being the non-interactive zero knowledge proof [3].
Note that in the implementation in which the biometric verication and the mutual au-
thenticity checking are combined into a single protocol, a sample has to be captured by
the biometric sensor and processed by the card before the mutual authenticity checking
between the card and reader, as the data needed to conduct this step is encrypted by using
a key derived from the user’s biometrics. This is fine if the biometric sensor is integrated
directly within the card but might be dangerous if the sensor is part of the reader itself
when this reader is non-genuine. In this situation, the acquisition of the biometric sample
of the user allows to decrypt the data stored in the card, which corresponds to an attack on
the confidentiality of this data. However, this is possible only if the adversary can steal the
card and successfully perform a physical violation of the hardware protection of the card
and read out the encrypted data, which is not supposed to be easy. Moreover, the impact
of this attack is mainly restricted to the privacy of the data stored on this particular card as
it does not enable an adversary controlling the fake reader to forge a card corresponding to
the identity of his choice. More specifically, once he has read this data the adversary might
be able to produce clones of this card but not to forge an arbitrary card. By drawing on the
revocation mechanism of group signature, it would also be possible to integrate the ability
of revoking a particular PIC into the architecture of the system. For instance, if a card has
been stolen or detected as being compromised, its private key of the group signature could
be revoked and placed in a “blacklist” to make genuine readers reject future use of the card.
However, this require the possibility of regularly updating this blacklist inside the reader’s
memory, which might be impractical for some applications.
8 Possible Extensions and Conclusion
Originally, the main purpose of the PIC is to enable a person to conduct tasks in the real
world without having to disclose his identity, but the same device could potentially be used
to access to online services such as e-government services or even e-business applications.
We list here some possible extensions to the original concept of PIC:
• Access to e-government services. In case of online access to e-government services, the
card could be plugged to a standard personal computer via an external trusted USB
reader certified by the government. The e-government services could include for in-
stance the online declaration of income, the consultation of the user’s file as recorded
in the database of a certain ministry or printing some official documents related to
the identity of the user. In this case, all the communication between the reader and
the e-government platform hosting the online services should be encrypted to pre-
vent potential information leakage. Of course, this does not preclude the risk of a
spyware infecting the user’s personal computer and gathering personal information
as the user interacts with software and hardware installed on his machine during his
access to e-government services. This is a serious threat that should be dealt with by
using common security techniques such as antivirus and malware detection tools.
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• Access to e-business applications. Another online extension would be to use the PIC as
an authentication mean during access to e-business applications. For instance, when
paying a purchase on Internet, the PIC could be used to show that the ownership
of the credit card used for the payment is verified through the PIC. Using a system
of anonymous credentials, it would be possible for the user to prove this statement
anonymously (i.e., without having to disclose explicitly his identity to the e-business
server). Of course, in this virtual context it may be more difficult for a user to keep an
explicit control on how his data are used and we may have to cope with more threats
than in the simple card-reader interaction scenario presented in the previous section.
For instance, we could imagine some kind of phishing attack where the user receives
an email making some advertisement for a particular online store together with an
associated website address. If he is the malicious owner of this website, a malicious
adversary could sit on the link between the card and the server and performs a man-
in-the-middle attack. More precisely, the adversary would pretend to be a genuine
online store to the card and relay the answers provided by the card to the real store
and vice versa and thus gain access to resources in the behalf of the owner of the PIC
(imagine for instance that the adversarymakes the user of the PIC pay for the tunes he
downloaded from an online music store). Note that the same kind of attack may also
apply for the access to e-government services in which case it could lead to a privacy
breach where the adversary learns personal information related to the user of the PIC
(which could be used later for fraudulent ends such as identity theft). To prevent such
attacks, a secure end-to-end channel could be established between the server and the
trusted USB card reader (with mutual authentication of the server and the reader),
and this even before the user-reader mutual authentication occurs. Afterwards, the
same secure channel should be used for all communications exchanged between the
user and the server during the session.
• E-voting. Consider also the scenario where the card is used for authentication dur-
ing an election where it is possible to vote electronically. One can imagine a protocol
where the user can prove his right to vote in a privacy-preserving manner using the
PIC and such that he can cast only one vote. For instance, this protocol could rely on
a one-show anonymous credential (instead of a multiple show) to provide anonymity
for the voter while ensuring that he can vote only once. However, even if this appli-
cation protects the identity of the voter and his choice, it does not address the usual
threat of coercion, which is a recurrent problem of the e-voting setting. Someone
could for instance point a gun at you when you are voting from your home or buy
your vote and ask to be there as a witness when you cast your vote online.
• Integration within a cell phone. Another possible extension to the privacy-preserving
identity card is to embed it directly in a device such as a cellular phone. Of course,
this raises the question of how much trust can be put in such a device. Indeed, the
user has to trust that his cell phone will only access his PIC in a rightful way and
will not try to collect information about him (e.g., by recording the questions and
their answers). Normally the answers of the PIC are encrypted at the beginning of
the chain (in the PIC itself) and not accessible to the phone, however in some situa-
tions it is possible to deduce them indirectly, for instance if the user gain access to a
resource such as a file after his interaction with an online service. Moreover, simply
registering the questions can be used to trace the actions of the user (for instance if he
often tries to have a discount when going to his neighborhood swimming pool) and
thus constitute a form of profiling. To trust that a cell-phone is perfectly secure may
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be more demanding than trusting that a PIC and a reader (which have been certified
by the government or an independent authority) are genuine. One of the advantage
of using a cell-phone is that it can provide the contactless facilities but without the
risk of the usual contactless smartcards which can be skimmed without even the user
noticing it. Another advantage is to extend the biometric diversity available, for in-
stance by using the integrated phone camera for iris recognition or its microphone for
voice recognition. The phone screen can also be used to display various information
(including the question asked) and its keyboard can be used for obtaining the consent
of the user with an active confirmation. The PIC may also use the computational and
memory capacities of the phone to its own benefit. For instance, the phone may add
another level of encryption to the output of the PIC or register questions asked so far
to the PIC and refuse to pass a question to the card when it decides that this question
may endanger the privacy of the user (which is a form of profiling, but this time for
the benefit of the user’s privacy).
• Use as an electronic wallet. Another extension is to use the PIC as an electronic wallet by
drawing on techniques such as one-time anonymous credentials. In such a scenario,
the content of the card could be updated regularly via a certified terminal. The one-
time credentials can play the role of electronic cash but also be used as e-ticket. For
instance, when Alice buys a concert ticket from a vending machine she could upload
the corresponding one-time credential on her privacy-preserving identity card while
paying with anonymous e-cash. Later, the one-time credential of her ticket could be
transmitted or displayed at the entrance of the concert hall via Alice’s cellphone. An-
other application may include buying electronic tokens to access a transport system.
• Integration of biometric sensor, display screen and keyboard within the card. If the card
integrates directly a biometric sensor, a display screen and a keyboard (or at least a
single key), this can greatly enhance the trust of the user regarding the PIC as he does
not need to trust anymore another apparatus such as an external biometric sensor or
the screen of the reader or of his cell phone. Indeed, if embedded within the PIC, the
biometric sensor can communicate directly with the smartcard thus limiting the risk
of someone eavesdropping the communication channel. Moreover, it makes it more
difficult for an adversary to acquire the biometric data of the user as the biometric
sensor is directly in the hands of the user himself. The screen can be used to display
the questions asked to the card but also its answers. Suppose for instance that the
current user needs to prove that he is the owner of a particular PIC and that when he
puts his fingerprints on the biometric reader his face is displayed on the screen of the
card. This does not give any new information except that the current user is also the
owner of the card (unless the card has been tampered with).
Such extensions would require an in-depth security analysis to ensure that they can be
safely integrated in a privacy-preserving identity card but it is technically feasible to de-
velop and deploy such an extended privacy-preserving identity card with currently avail-
able technologies. One fundamental question is whether or not developing a identity card
achieving many functionalities differing from its original purpose (as it is currently the
trend in many countries) is really a good idea at all. Indeed, it constitutes a single point of
failure that if compromised will have serious consequences including a major impact on the
privacy of the user.
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